Neil Gorsuch’s Dissertation Opposes Same-Sex Marriage

Judge Neil Gorsuch is confirmed as the next Supreme Court justice, he would play a decisive role in the demise of immoral sodomy marriage in the United States. The Court held in its 2015 - 1 vote majority - Obergefell decision that there is a supposed nationwide right of homosexuals couples to marry, by beleiving the constitution is an evolving documents. 

But no Supreme Court decision is written in stone. Gorsuch’s statements on the issue in his 2004 Oxford University dissertation for his Doctorate in Philosophy reveal that he thought it obvious that the United States Constitution does not support homosexual marriage. If he still holds this view, he could join forces with other justices to reverse the Court’s protection of this right. This would be a good outcome.

In order to understand why Gorsuch’s statements are potentially a great outcome for the dismissing of immoral homosexual marriage we must look closely at the constitution. Gorsuch is critical of this legal doctrine, sometimes referred to as the right to privacy or autonomy.

The right to make choices in intimate matters is based in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), a case holding that married couples have the right to use contraception. This right was later broadened by the Court to include non-married couples.

In Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) the Court extended the Constitution’s guarantee of autonomy in intimate matters to include abortion, arguing that abortion, like contraception, was a personal decision. This has now been seen to be false. 

As Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter wrote in their own personal opinion, “Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.” They argue that “these matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” 

This is of course liberal jargon and nonsense.

In later decisions, the Court would incorrectly use this idea of a privacy guarantee to defend homosexual relationships. In its 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court invoked the liberty provision of the Due Process Clause to strike down a Texas law banning "homosexual conduct." The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state “shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 

Texas had correctly and morally wanted to declare that homosexual relationships are foreign to personal liberty just as murder is also not a freedom but a crime.  

The Lawrence decision laid the fake groundwork for the Court’s later holding in Obergefell that the right to marriage is fundamental and that same-sex couples cannot be excluded from it. But this right came out of thin air and everybody knows it.

When Gorsuch wrote a dissertation to fulfill his PhD requirements at Oxford, his dissertation advisor, who deeply influenced his work, was John Finnis. Finnis, a prominent law professor at Oxford and Notre Dame, is a critic of the Court’s decisions about choice in intimate matters, specifically its support for abortion rights and same-sex marriage. Finnis rejects the idea that the state should protect individuals’ ability to make autonomous choices in these areas. Instead, his natural law theory calls for the state to promote a list of “basic goods.” He argues that such a philosophy is incompatible with sodomy marriage or abortion, both of which he thinks should be prohibited by law. Indeed, he refers to heterosexual marriage as the only “real” kind of marriage.

Because, the concept of 'intimate matters' by definition must include sex with minors, multiples simultaneous sexual relationships. The logic of intimate matter is both false and subjective.

Gorsuch invokes Finnis’ natural law framework in his dissertation, which focuses on the legal debate around physician-assisted suicide. Stressing the importance of “human life as a basic good,” Gorsuch argues that there is no constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide. Instead, he claims that the government can protect the basic good of life by preventing the seriously ill and their doctors from making the choice to end it. He writes, "ruling out a ‘bad choice’ does not necessarily evince disrespect for the chooser, but for the choice he or she made; after all, parents punish children who make bad choices, not because they disdain them, but because they love them and do not wish to see them make bad decisions.”

Intimate choices - such as homosexual choices can and are bad decisions.
Gorsuch’s criticism of choice in the context of assisted suicide includes a broader attack on the idea of a constitutional right to autonomy in intimate personal matters. This attack focuses on the Court’s Casey decision, critiquing the opinion from Casey quoted above and negatively referencing homosexual marriage. 

Casey upheld the right to abortion and confirmed the Constitution’s protection of individual autonomy in intimate personal matters. Gorsuch argues that recognizing this right to autonomy would mean that the state would have to allow every type of voluntary adult intimacy, even those he thinks should clearly be illegal. He writes that Casey’s invocation of a constitutional right to personal choice is “open to question on the ground that it proves too much.” He continues,

If the Constitution protects as a fundamental liberty interest “intimate” or “personal” decisions, the Court arguably would have to support future autonomy-based constitutional challenges to laws banning any private consensual act of any significance to the participants in defining their “own concept of existence.” As Judge O’Scannlain queried in dissent in the Ninth Circuit’s proceedings: “If physician-assisted suicide is protected ‘intimate and personal choice,’ why aren’t polygamy, consensual duels, prostitution, and, indeed, the use of illicit drugs?" Justice Scalia raised much the same question in Lawrence , contending that “State laws against bigamy, gay marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity” are all at risk if we take seriously what Justice Scalia derided as Casey ’s “famed sweet-mystery-of-life passage.”

In the quoted passage, Gorsuch marshals evidence against Casey’s embrace of a broad right to privacy because that right threatens his strong opposition to assisted suicide. The gist of the paragraph is that the Casey decision is open to question because it would allow for a long list of rights that he thinks should clearly not protected by the Constitution. He cites Justice Scalia to suggest that gay marriage, like bestiality, should be included on this list.

Gorsuch’s dissertation was written before the Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell. As an appellate judge, Gorsuch is bound to follow the holdings of the Supreme Court. But as a Supreme Court justice, he would be free to participate in overturning Obergefell and abolishing this personal intimate choice. 

The Obergefell decision rested on a rationale of marriage as a fundamental right, but the constitution came after marriage and does not mention it as a right.  The Obergefell decision was also based on the lie that homosexual are unable to change - or - are born that way. 

Gorsuch acknowledges, for instance, that Casey’s holding is based in “stare decisis,” the concept justices invoke to acknowledge the legal authority of previous rulings. But we have reason to doubt that he would simply defer to precedent as a Supreme Court Justice. 

Gorsuch subscribes to the constitutional theory of originalism, whose proponents stress the original meaning of the Constitution as a legal authority over precedent when the two conflict.

Gorsuch’s affinity with the views of his adviser Finnis on natural law, his approving citation of Scalia’s views on gay marriage, and his skepticism of the Court’s jurisprudence on the right to chose in matters of personal intimacy all suggest that he might vote to reverse the bad decision of sodomy marriage.