Romans 1:26-27 Homosexual argument: "What is natural to me"
The starting point must be the possible meanings of physis in Romans 1:26–27.
Greek Usage
Physis occurs in profuse quantity throughout secular Greek writings, especially philosophy. We can study only a representative selection. The LSJ lexicon, including its supplement, cites eight broad categories of use for physis:22
1. origin, including birth and growth;23
2. natural form or constitution of a person, animal, or thing, including nature or character;24
3. regular order of nature;
4. philosophical order, referring to nature as an originating, creative power25 or “Nature” personified or as an elemental substance (as fire, water, air, earth26) or in the idea of the creation, nature;
5. concrete term, as in the case of “creature” or “humanity”;
6. kind, sort, or species;
7. gender distinction;27 and
8. legal distinction, a term roughly synonymous with “law” (nomos).
There is no suggestion here that physis means “what is natural to me” or “orientation,” which, you will recall (p. 14), is a major argument of the reinterpreters. The second definition comes closest, speaking of one’s “character” or “natural disposition,” one’s “propensity.”28 Yet this usage points to what results from origin or growth and includes the instinct of animals. No one applies it to the source of homosexual desires.
In the third category occur examples of kata physin (“according to nature”) and para physin (“contrary to nature,” which occurs in Rom. 1:26–27). Here occurs the well-known statement by Aristotle (Politica 1253a3), “man is a political animal by nature” (physei).29
Gunther Harder follows the outline of LSJ in discussing classical uses of physis.30 He points out that early Greek thought distinguished law and nature as separate entities that together determined one’s life. Nature was also “distinguished from the field of morals and ethics.”31
Helmut Koester, in his lengthy discussion, seeks to show how the concept of physis developed in two directions, one emphasizing origin, the other emphasizing being or substance.32 Although he follows the general outline of the preceding studies, he makes important clarifications and additions. He notes, for example, that Greeks call one’s tendency, quality, or character physis because this nature is a given and “not dependent on conscious direction or education.” Aristotle and Plato developed a dual-idea of nature: First, it is the true character of things. Second, it is the origin of being.33 They equated this universal nature with deity and give to the adjective physikos the sense of “natural law.”
In regard to nature and ethics, the Greeks often viewed law and nature in antithesis.34 Natural law consisted of two opposing spheres of nature and law, to which each person is subject. According to nature means “normal,” and against nature means “abnormal.” This distinction became the foundation for ethical judgments, especially regarding sexuality. Plato condemns pederasty and marriage between men as para physin.35
Koester’s last category concerns nature as a cosmic and vital principle in the Stoics. Stoics sought to bridge the antithesis in such thought by defining physis as a universal divine principle. Human beings received the logos, their own being, by nature. The goal of life is to attain to what corresponds to that nature or essence. Common sense or reason enables man to know what is kata physin and what is para physin.36
Koester clearly shows the shortcoming of Greek thinking, for each person is nature, but each is also in bondage. That truly left a choice, for one couldn’t have it both ways. If nature was the true character of things, the logos, then the Stoics were right. If it was the origin of being but the antithesis of law, then the Gnostics were right, and purity could be found only in spiritual realities, never in the physical world. Stoicism turned one inward to self and the natural world. Gnosticism looked outward, away from the natural world.
Only in Jewish and Christian belief in nature as the creation of God “did the concept of natural law become significant, since man could relate himself to the Creator and Lawgiver as the ultimate critical court.”37 Koester suggests that only in Jewish and Christian thought is the antithesis of law vs. nature removed. If God creates nature and gives law, they both reflect His character or being. There is a “natural” and there is a “lawful.” They are complementary and come from God. There can be no more terror of law vs. nature, says Koester in application. Knowing that God is love, the person knows that law and nature both contribute to a person’s highest good.
Only two senses of the word physis occur in the secular papyri at the time of the New Testament. To the general world nature meant “birth or physical origin” or “innate properties or powers—what comes from origin.” Physikos meant “natural, inward.”38
De Young, J. B. (2000). Homosexuality: Contemporary Claims Examined in Light of the Bible and Other Ancient Literature and Law (pp. 147–149). Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications.
Greek Usage
Physis occurs in profuse quantity throughout secular Greek writings, especially philosophy. We can study only a representative selection. The LSJ lexicon, including its supplement, cites eight broad categories of use for physis:22
1. origin, including birth and growth;23
2. natural form or constitution of a person, animal, or thing, including nature or character;24
3. regular order of nature;
4. philosophical order, referring to nature as an originating, creative power25 or “Nature” personified or as an elemental substance (as fire, water, air, earth26) or in the idea of the creation, nature;
5. concrete term, as in the case of “creature” or “humanity”;
6. kind, sort, or species;
7. gender distinction;27 and
8. legal distinction, a term roughly synonymous with “law” (nomos).
There is no suggestion here that physis means “what is natural to me” or “orientation,” which, you will recall (p. 14), is a major argument of the reinterpreters. The second definition comes closest, speaking of one’s “character” or “natural disposition,” one’s “propensity.”28 Yet this usage points to what results from origin or growth and includes the instinct of animals. No one applies it to the source of homosexual desires.
In the third category occur examples of kata physin (“according to nature”) and para physin (“contrary to nature,” which occurs in Rom. 1:26–27). Here occurs the well-known statement by Aristotle (Politica 1253a3), “man is a political animal by nature” (physei).29
Gunther Harder follows the outline of LSJ in discussing classical uses of physis.30 He points out that early Greek thought distinguished law and nature as separate entities that together determined one’s life. Nature was also “distinguished from the field of morals and ethics.”31
Helmut Koester, in his lengthy discussion, seeks to show how the concept of physis developed in two directions, one emphasizing origin, the other emphasizing being or substance.32 Although he follows the general outline of the preceding studies, he makes important clarifications and additions. He notes, for example, that Greeks call one’s tendency, quality, or character physis because this nature is a given and “not dependent on conscious direction or education.” Aristotle and Plato developed a dual-idea of nature: First, it is the true character of things. Second, it is the origin of being.33 They equated this universal nature with deity and give to the adjective physikos the sense of “natural law.”
In regard to nature and ethics, the Greeks often viewed law and nature in antithesis.34 Natural law consisted of two opposing spheres of nature and law, to which each person is subject. According to nature means “normal,” and against nature means “abnormal.” This distinction became the foundation for ethical judgments, especially regarding sexuality. Plato condemns pederasty and marriage between men as para physin.35
Koester’s last category concerns nature as a cosmic and vital principle in the Stoics. Stoics sought to bridge the antithesis in such thought by defining physis as a universal divine principle. Human beings received the logos, their own being, by nature. The goal of life is to attain to what corresponds to that nature or essence. Common sense or reason enables man to know what is kata physin and what is para physin.36
Koester clearly shows the shortcoming of Greek thinking, for each person is nature, but each is also in bondage. That truly left a choice, for one couldn’t have it both ways. If nature was the true character of things, the logos, then the Stoics were right. If it was the origin of being but the antithesis of law, then the Gnostics were right, and purity could be found only in spiritual realities, never in the physical world. Stoicism turned one inward to self and the natural world. Gnosticism looked outward, away from the natural world.
Only in Jewish and Christian belief in nature as the creation of God “did the concept of natural law become significant, since man could relate himself to the Creator and Lawgiver as the ultimate critical court.”37 Koester suggests that only in Jewish and Christian thought is the antithesis of law vs. nature removed. If God creates nature and gives law, they both reflect His character or being. There is a “natural” and there is a “lawful.” They are complementary and come from God. There can be no more terror of law vs. nature, says Koester in application. Knowing that God is love, the person knows that law and nature both contribute to a person’s highest good.
Only two senses of the word physis occur in the secular papyri at the time of the New Testament. To the general world nature meant “birth or physical origin” or “innate properties or powers—what comes from origin.” Physikos meant “natural, inward.”38
De Young, J. B. (2000). Homosexuality: Contemporary Claims Examined in Light of the Bible and Other Ancient Literature and Law (pp. 147–149). Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications.
